Abstract: Priestly v. Fowler has long been noted as the source of the doctrine of common employment. This Article, however, argues that the case is better understood in the context of the then-emerging independent tort of negligence-specifically, as an unsuccessful attempt to require of masters a duty of care towards their servants. The Article re-examines the facts, arguments, personalities, and various reported versions of the case in tracing the effort to establish a new duty of care. The Article traces, as well, to another case, Hutchinson v. York, the true origins of the common employment doctrine. Finally, the Article compares the perspectives of nineteenth century authorities to those of modern writers in establishing how Priestly came to be detached from its true significance.
INTRODUCTION
Although it may fairly be presumed that workmen have always been involved in accidents during the course of their employment, Plieslley v. Fowler 1 is the first known recorded decision of an employee having sued an employer for work-related injuries. 2 
Consequently, the
Boston College Law R~'View [Vol. 44:689 case has become familiar to several generations of legal commentators, most of whom repeat by rote the accepted wisdom that the opinion originates the doctrine of common employment, 3 and censure in often colourful terms the ideology they deem displayed in Abinger, C.B.'s ruling. 4 Recently, a handful of studies have reassessed the decision within its historical context. Brian Simpson, for example, demonstrated how changes in the Poor Law precipitated the litigation. 5 Richard Epstein divined from lack of direct prior precedent the existence of an "ironclad rule" precluding employers' liability to their servants for industri~l accidents. 6 In contrast, Terrance Ingman, in a pair of articles, asserted that the judgment controverted an already established employers' liability for workplace injuries, while also laying the groundwork for the defence of volenti non fit iujuria. 7 Expressing skepticism, R.W. Kostal was unconvinced of the case's significance, deeming it the "unreliable precedent of an unreliable judge. " 8 Each of these treatmasters. All that is known about the first is that the action settled out of court. The second involved a factory girl named Elizabeth Cottrell who was grievously injured when her dress was caught on an unfenced shaft. Before Rolfe, B. at the I840 Liverpool Summer Assizes, the defendant factory owner Samuel Stocks conceded liability for £I 00, plus £600 in costs for the redoubtable advocate (and later Court of Common Pleas judge) Cresswell Cresswell. See EnwtN Fowler the famous or infamous doctrine of common employment was first laid down.").
• For instance, Friedman and Ladinsky's appraisal that the opinion was "diffuse and unperceptive," linked to "the onrush of the industrial revolution." Lawrence M. I978) . 5 See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at I00-34. 6 See Richard ments, however, works from the time-honoured premise that P1iestley was the source of the defence of common employment. Diverging from conventional scholarship, this Article demonstrates that P1iestley is better understood within the framework of the emerging independent tort of negligence as an unsuccessful attempt to fashion a duty of care on behalf of masters towards their servants. 9 Specifically, it will argue that Charles Priestley's counsel sought to emulate the arguments (and hence the success) of two Assize verdicts that had extended the customary limitations of liability for negligence earlier that same year: Vaughan v. Menlove 0 and, to a lesser extent, Lanf51idge v. Levy. 11 The Article will then illustrate how some thirteen years later, Hutchinson v. Yodt, Newcastle & Berwick Railway Co. 12 (and its companion decision Wigmore v. Jay), 13 truly produced the doctrine of common employment in England. 14 This is an assessment with which a plurality of Victorian jurists, as well as the vast majority of contemporary treatise writers agreed. Nevertheless, because of the character of the opinion that Abinger, C.B. had issued in P1iestley, a revisionist interpretation developed over time and Priestley, rather than Hutchinson, came to stand for the source of the defence. The Article concludes by evaluating more recent reconsiderations of Pliestley and revealing their general inaccuracy. 9 Unsuccessful in the immediate sense that Charles Priestley's injuries were uncompensated. In a later work, the author will illustrate how nineteenth century English appellate court judges laboured assiduously to extend this non-liability for personal injuries to their sen·ants. At the same time, the narrow window of liability which did (rarely) prevail may be said to originate in Priestley. 
I. THE CASE oF PRIESTLEY v. FowLERI5
On May 30, 1835, Charles Priestley, 16 a servant of butcher Thomas Fowler of Market Deeping, was ordered to conduct mutton to market. The meat was placed in a wagon driven by William Beeton, another of Fowler's employeesP Priestley was to accompany the cart only as far as Buckden, some twenty miles from Peterborough, where he was to sell some quantity of the loaded provisions. Beeton would then continue on to London to vend the remainder.
The four-horse team could not move the van and 'jibbed," meaning that they stopped in their tracks and would not move forward. Turning to the nearby Fowler, Beeton protested that "he ought to be ashamed of himself for sending such a dangerous load." Fowler responded by calling Beeton "a damned fool for saying anything of the sort." Although present during the exchange, Priestley held his peace. 18 Following this ominous start, the wagon soon embarked on 15 ·nn EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1137 (1992 . The latter case \vas determined in the Court of Exchequer one term before Lord Abinger was appointed Chief Baron. 1 7 None of the accounts make clear who loaded the wagon with the "peds" (i.e., hampers) of mutton.
1 8 Diverging from the other four accounts, Mu1phy & Hurlstonc reported that the "plaintiff remonstrated, on account of the cart being oYerloaded, and too weak to bear the load, and it being dangerous to go by it." Plicstlcy, 3 Murph. & H. at 305. Although arguments before the Court of Exchequer would later make heavy weather over Priestley's acquiescent riding in the van, the discrepancy over the complaint's source is inunaterial. Whether Priestley or Beeton, Priestley either was of the opinion, had confirmed his opinion, or was given notice of Beeton's opinion, that the van was overloaded. Nearing Peterborough, Beeton and Priestley heard a cracking noise as the cart rolled over some stones. Consequently, they had the van inspected by Gideon Lucas, owner of the King's Head Inn. The perusal, conducted by lantern light because they had departed Market Deeping at nine thirty at night, revealed nothing amiss with the cart. Nevertheless, while traversing the mile south from Peterborough towards Norman Cross, the wagon's front axle cracked along a third of its length and gave way, overturning the vehicle. Beeton was pulled ahead of the van's collapse by the horses, escaping substantial harm. Priestley was less fortunate: some four hundredweight worth of mutton fell on him, resulting in a broken thigh, a dislocated shoulder, and various other injuries.
As was customary upon the occurrence of such accidents,2° Priestley was taken to the closest public lodging, in this case the King's Head Inn from which he and Beeton had recently departed. Lying "in a very precarious state," Priestley remained at the inn for nineteen weeks, during the course of which he was treated by two surgeons. 30 Priestley pleaded two grounds in support of his claim against his master, a latent defect and the van's overloading. The declaration stated that when Fowler had "directed" the plaintiff to accompany the mutton to market "in" the van, Fowler was under a duty "to use due and proper care that said van should be in a proper state of repair" and "not be overloaded, and that the plaintiff should be safely and securely carried thereby." As a result of Fowler having breached this Throughout the trial, Serjeant Goulbourne emphasised the overloading claim, with contrary evidence presented by the parties as to the weight both properly and actually borne by the wagon. Evidence was also given as to the extent of the axle's defect prior to the accident. In putting Priestley's case to the jury, Goulbourne played to their sympathies, remonstrating the unprincipled behaviour of the "wealthy butcher" defendant towards the plaintiff who "was one of a large family," and asking for not only reimbursement of medical expenses, but also recompense for Priestley's pain and suffering:
[T]hat a very opulent tradesman, a man in a very large way of business like the defendant, should have driven this poor lad into court, for he would say that not only justice, but also in common humanity, he ought to pay the pecuniary damages his client had sustained, and also some remuneration for the suffering he had undergone, and the deprivation under which he was now labouring and would labour for the rest of his days.32
Opposing the claim, Serjeant Adams denied that the cart had been overloaded, noting that Priestley had continued on the journey after first witnessing Beeton's protest, and then hearing the cart crack near Peterborough. Nor could Fowler be held liable, Adams continued, as he was only bound to use "such ordinary care and diligence as he would use over himself," and the defendant had been satisfied as to the state of his property. 33 In any event, Serjeant Adams asserted that as a legal matter, Fowler as a master was not liable to his servant Priestley. This was because there was "no such case in the books, " 34 and for good reason: "(I]f the defendant was responsible in this case, every master was liable to any accident that might occur to his servant about his work. " 35 No evidence reveals the possible negligence of Priestley's fellow servants ever being raised or at issue during the trial. 31 Without identifying a related judgment, Park,]. disagreed with Adams's contention "that there is no such case on the books," andrefused to nonsuit the plaintiff, opining that "the defendant is liable. " 36 At the same time, he pointed out that the jury could consider Priestley's acquiescence in light of the wagon's condition, and granted Adams permission to move the full court in Westminster should the jury enter a verdict against his client. 37 Next, instructing the jury, Park,]. stated that Fowler could not be held liable for a hidden defect in the wagon. Instead the only question here was,-and it was one of fact-was the van shamelessly overladen; was it laden unsafely and to a dangerous degree; and, if so, was the master acquainted with the fact? ... if the jury were of opinion that the accident was occasioned by the 'pigheadedness' of the defendant in overloading the van they would find for the plaintiff. 38 After deliberating for less than half an hour, the jury awarded Charles Priestley a sizeable £100.3 9
During the following Michaelmas Term of 1836, Serjeant Adams obtained a rule to arrest the judgment on the ground "that there was nothing in the declaration to throw any liability on the master. " 40 Adams also moved for a new trial, but this part of the rule was abandoned when Fowler bec-ame bankrupt. 41 As a result, the arguments 36 presented on January 16, 1837 before the full Court of Exchequer 42 were confined solely to the motion in arrest ofjudgment. 43 Showing cause, Serjeant Goulbourne began by conceding that a probable issue 44 was whether Priestley had been required to ride in the van, or had been at liberty to walk alongside it. Such concern was vitiated when the Court of Exchequer intimated the sufficiency of the declaration on this subject. 45 Next, after acknowledging that the suit was "a case of the first impression" without "precedent exactly in point," 46 Goulbourne declared that the action was "maintainable on general principles of law, " 47 analogising Priestley's situation to that of "an ordinary coach passenger. " 48 To this, Abinger, C. B. raised the distinction that a coach passenger had no means of knowing the coach's condition, whereas a servant could make his own inspection.4 9 Serjeant Goulbourne averred that as in the coach/passenger situation, the master/servant relationship was contractual. 50 The servant paid consideration with his labour, and the master was in turn duty bound "not to expose him to risk in performing these services. " 51 4~ Moreover, a master, knowing a room to be infectious, puts a servant to sleep there, and the sen·ant incurs a disease, the master would be clearly liable; but it would be otherwise if he had put him in a room where the windows were broken, and the place otherwise so obviously ruinous, as that he himself could actually see its condition; in the latter case you would hardly say that the master would be liable for an injury that resulted to the servant. the jury had found for the plaintiff, two inferences had to be "intended," or drawn. First, that "it was the master's duty to provide a proper vehicle," and second, "that the master knew the van was overloaded."52
Plaintiff's counsel concluded his averments by arguing that even if brought in assumpsit, the action would have alleged the same basis for recovery because the law implied a promise "co-extensive" to the violations of duty alleged under case in the declaration. In response, the Chief Baron opined that liability would exist in those circumstances if either the master had "maliciously designed" to injure his servant, or he had "positively guaranteed" his safety. Seizing upon this opening, Serjeant Goulbourne stated that after the verdict "it will be intended that the master was aware of the danger, and that he denied to the servant that there was any danger. " 53 Parke, B. then posed a hypothetical: "Suppose I send my servant on the roof, to clear away the snow; if the roof gives way am I liable?" Serjeant Goulbourne replied that the present case differed because "it is not a mere state of insufficiency; for the overloading of the cart is a positive act, which occasions the accident. " 54 At no point during the repartee did either Serjeant Goulbourne or the Exchequer Barons touch on the likelihood of Priestley's injury originating from the oversight of a fellow servant.
In arrest of the judgment, Serjeant Adams contended that the plaintiff had improperly framed his action in case rather than in assumpsit.55 This error was dispositive, for in order to maintain an action, five circumstances had to exist:
ruly." Parke, B. responded that under those circumstances the duty to carry the passenger safely would only extend as far as the conditions known to the passenger, i.e., that of a drunken driver with a rambunctious horse. Abinger, C.B. added that a "stage-coachman" who knowingly drove a recalcitrant horse would also be barred from recovery. 55 Because the action alleged was "in the nature of a con tract," it should have been brought in assumpsit. Instead, the plaintiff had sought relief in case, which as a tort required common-law liability to exist between master and servant. !d.
First, that the van was overloaded, by defendant's order. Second, that plaintiff was ignorant of its being overloaded. Third, there must be an order by the defendant, to plaintiff, to go on the van. Fourth, that it was necessary for the plaintiff to do so, in order to perform his duty in respect of the goods. And, fifth, that the order shall be a lawful command which the servant is bound to obey.56 699 The action having raised three of Adams's prerequisites to liability, the Barons of the Exchequer engaged defendant's counsel in a protracted discussion of whether Priestley was required to ride in the wagon or could have walked alongside it, then intended that the declaration was sufficient on this point. 57 Serjeant Adams concluded his advocacy by proclaiming that "there is nothing in the declaration which shews that this was anything more than a mere accident; and for a mere accident which happens in a master's service, the master is not responsible." 58 As with the arguments presented by his opposing counsel, Adams never raised the prospect of vitiating his client's liability due to the intervening act of a fellow servant.
Instead of rendering a decision on the day of argument, the Court of Exchequer reserved judgment, presenting its opinion on November 23, 1837.59 For the Court, 60 Abinger, C.B. delivered a rambling opinion arresting the judgment. 61 The Chief Baron began by dismissing as a matter of law the assertion that Fowler's knowledge of overloading could be intended after verdict. 62 The only issue to be decided was both narrow and clear: whether "the mere relation of 56 ld. at 305-07.
5 7 That Serjeant Adams raised this issue after the Court of Exchequer had already disposed of it during Serjeant Goulbourne's appeal lends additional support to the Law Journal report that Goulbourne had spoken on a previous occasion. See Priestley, 7 LJ. Ex. at 43. 58 ld. 59 The ten month delay, according to Simpson, "suggests some difficulty in achieving unanimity." SJMI'SON, supra note 2, at 107; sec also LINCOLN, Run.AND & STAMFORD MER· CURY, Jan. 20, 1837 ("[t]he Court would take time to look into the case, as it was a nice one, and invoh·ed some important consequences").
60 Whose constituency had not been altered in the interval. Foss, supra note 42, at 62. 61 "With one minor exception, the opinion is related verbatim in all the reported versions.
6~ In so doing, Abi.nger, C.B. "was not evaluating evidence, but determining as a matter of law whether knowledge could be 'intended' after verdict. master and servant" implied a common-law duty "on the part of the master, to cause the servant to be safely and securely carried." Lacking "precedent for the present action," the Court was at "liberty to look at the consequences of a decision the one way or the other. " 63 Deciding "the question upon general principles," Abinger, C.B. cautioned that if legal culpability was upheld under these circumstances "the principle of that liability will be found to carry us to an alarming extent." 64 He then put forward a number of examples in dicta illustrating the magnitude to which such a rule would cause principals to be responsible to their "inferior agents":
If the owner of the carriage, therefore, is responsible for the sufficiency of his carriage to his servant, he is responsible for the negligence of his coach-maker, or his harness-maker, or his coachman. The footman, therefore, who stands behind the carriage, may have an action against his master for a defect in the carriage, owing to the negligence of the coachmaker, or for a defect in the harness arising from the negligence of the harness-maker, or for the drunkenness, neglect, or want of skill in the coachman.65
Even more distressing to Lord Abinger was that the rationale of the case could be broadened further, allowing, for example, a master to "be liable to the servant, for the negligence of the chambermaid, in putting him into a damp bed. "66 In other words, Abinger, C.B. clearly foresaw that permitting Priestley to recover directly against his master in this novel action would open the floodgates to vicarious liability, entitling servants injured by their peers to recover against their common masters. Because the consequences of such an extension would 66 In addition, Abinger, C.B. anticipated that
[t]he master would also be liable for the acts of the upholsterer for sending in a crazy bedstead, whereby the servant was made to fall down, while asleep, and injure himself; for the negligence of the cook in not properly cleansing the copper vessels used in the kitchen; of the butcher in supplying the family with meat of a quality injurious to health; of the builder for a defect in the foundation of the house, whereby it fell and injured both the master and servant in ruins.
engender both "inconvenience" and "absurdity," general principles provided "a sufficient argument" against liability. 67
Acknowledging that the master/servant relationship bound the master directly to "provide for the safety of his servant ... to the best of his judgment, information, and belief," the Chief Baron emphasised that it could "never" imply an obligation for the master "to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of himself." At the same time, the servant was "not bound to risk his safety in the service of his master" and was free to "decline any service in which he reasonably apprehend[ed] injury to himself."68 This was because servants were in as good, if not better positions, than their masters to appreciate possible hazards.69
Lord Abinger concluded with a last policy argument against upholding the jury's verdict. Allowing this action "would be an encouragement to the servant to omit that diligence and caution which he is in duty bound to exercise on behalf of his master," and which offers much better protection against injuries "than any recourse against his master for damages could possibly afford. [Vol. 44:689 and as a mode of committing a tort. 71 Acknowledging that liability for inadvertence had existed in cases from the time of the Year Books,7 2 he set the temporal boundary for the rise of negligence as a separate tort at the point when three ingredients had been present: ( 1) a legal duty by the defendant towards the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by either inadvertence or insufficiently advertent conduct; and (3) the plaintiff sustaining harm as a consequence of the defendant's breach of duty.73 Winfield concluded that although all three theories necessary for a separate doctrine were present prior to the second quarter of the nineteenth century,74 they were not yet distinctly enumerated as principles. 75 Then, because industrial machinery, and in particular railways, "killed any object from a Minister of State to a wandering cow," negligence evolved from having been only a method through which various torts were committed into "an independent tort which sprang from the action upon the case. " 76 Prior to industrialisation, Winfield explained, inadvertent injury gave rise to civil liability for the violation of five distinct types of duty. These duties emanated from: ( 1) a public calling such as an innkeeper, common carrier, surgeon or farrier; (2) a public office, most commonly a sheriff; (3) a bailment; (4) a prescription or custom, such as omitting to provide beer for the beadle of a hundred; and ( 5) the control of dangerous things, such as unruly animals or fire. 77 With the exception of the last category, which was grounded in a "custom of the realm," these duties involved an undertaking which equated the individual's status with his attendant obligations. 78 According to Winfield, performing an act defined by specific status-for example shoeing a horse-pre-supposed a proper use of 71 care. vVhen injury resulted, it gave rise to liability regardless of intent. Whether the farrier was imprudent or sadistic was irrelevant: the point was that the plain tiff had taken his horse to the blacksmith and that its shoe was improperly fitted. Winfield therefore maintained that prior to the nineteenth century, negligence was almost never mentioned, although "the idea of it is implied. "79 C.H.S. Fifoot, 80 MJ. Prichard,81 and J.H. Baker82 have each in turn demonstrated the understated nature of Winfield's description of pre-nineteenth century negligence as a "skein of threads" yielding "little more than a bundle of frayed ends. " 83 Instead, each successively traced distinct trends in negligence liability back to the fourteenth century.
Fifoot asserted that the "prime factor" in the transformation of negligence into an independent tort was "the luxuriant crop of 'running-down' actions" created by the economic prosperity of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 84 Thus, instead of the industrial machinery of the second quarter of the nineteenth century, it was the road machinery of the preceding fifty years that "multiplied accidents and fertilised litigation," propelling forward the doctrine of negligence. 85 Prichard moved Fifoot's chronology forward by asserting that a "thin trickle" of running-down actions from the late seventeenth century "should be regarded as the beginnings of the tort of negligence."86 Examining these suits, Prichard maintained that plaintiffs brought their actions in case, alleging a form of negligence in the at- 79 Sec id. at 44-45. 80 tendant cum clauses due to two procedural reasons. First, plaintiffs were unable to join trespass and case actions because the first were considered appropriate for claims of directly caused harm, the latter for consequentially engendered injury. Second, pleading trespass engendered a significant risk for defendants to avoid liability by averring that although the injury was direct, their servants' driving caused it. 87 Last, Prichard demonstrated that a likely origin of negligence is the 1676 case of Mitchil v. Alestree, 88 which describes the defendant's liability as arising out of his servants' carelessness. 89 Finally, Baker established how Mitchil "was only a significant step to later eyes" because traces of negligence as an independent tort can be seen as far back as the thirteenth century. 90 Among the better known pre-seventeenth century cases that Baker refers to in support of this proposition is the fifteenth century "Case of the Thorns," 91 most often referred to in modern textbooks for the proposition of strict liability. Contrary to this commonly held misconception, the now-discovered record reveals that the action "as pleaded went only to intention; and the remarks of the judges in rejecting it do not assume strict liability. ''9 2 Accordingly, lack of intention, and thus nonnegligent behaviour, was clearly offered and recognised as a defence as early as the fifteenth century.
This most recent treatment, by Baker, harmonises the prior studies by explaining that the sparsity of pre-nineteenth century negligence actions is attributable to the governing procedural forms of action. 93 Specifically, if a plain tiff was injured by an intentional harm he would sue in trespass. If the harm was non-forcible, then assumpsit was available when a prior relationship between the parties caused the injury, for example, if the defendant was a common carrier. such a relationship, the plaintiff could only sue in case because of the indirect nature of the injury. Until the late eighteenth century these type of harms were usnally caused by fire or dangerous animals, and each in turn was governed by its own procedural forms. As a result, the number of cases specifically asserting negligence was reduced to a small handful, leading "legal historians to the conclusion that negligence could not have been actionable per se. "9 4 In addition, if defendants did manage to raise the issue of fault, they did so before a jury after having first pleaded the general issue of "not guilty." Due to defendants' explanations not usually being recorded, the extent of pleading an absence of negligence as a defence prior to the late eighteenth century is not clearly known. 95 Despite reservations over the extent of the existence of an independent tort of negligence prior to the nineteenth century, 96 these scholars do not take exception to Winfield's theory that a general duty of care extending to individuals not in pre-existing relationships did not arise until the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Specifically, Winfield avowed that "the year 1837 marked a turning point"9 7 with the cases of Vaughan v. Menlovtfl 8 and Lang~idge v. Levy. 99 Building upon principles set forth in these decisions, Winfield cultivated a "contract fallacy" theory 100 under which negligence-based duties of care evolved as an alternative to extending already recognised 91 BAKER, mpra note 3, at 462. 95 Sec id. at 456. 96 Although cautioning that more evidence is necessary to support this view, Simpson is "inclined" towards the "hypothesis" that "what happened in the nineteenth century was not the substitution of new law for old law, but the creation of law where there had been none before. liabilities arising from either the five pre-industrial type duties or individual contractual agree men ts.1o1
In l'aughan v. Menlove,1°2 the plaintiff sued his neighbour at nisi p1ius for damages arising from "wrongfully, negligently, and improperly" keeping a haystack in contravention of his "duty. " 103 After the defendant pleaded not guilty, Patteson, J. instructed the jury to consider whether the fire had been occasioned by the defendant's gross negligence. He also instructed the jury to bear in mind that the defendant "was bound to proceed with such reasonable caution as a prudent man would have exercised under such circmnstances."104 A £5 verdict was entered for the plaintiff. Soon thereafter the defendant obtained a rule nisi for a new trial on the ground that the jury should have been directed to consider whether the defendant had acted to the best of his judgment, rather than whether he had been grossly negligent with reference to an uncertain standard of ordinary prudence.105 After noting that this was a case of first impression, the Court of Common Pleas, through Tindal, CJ., upheld the trial court upon the long-lived and sweeping principle that everyone has a duty to use their land so as not to injure others. 103 The haystack or "hay-rick" was constructed on the defendant's side of the boundary between the parties' land, in close proximity to the plaintiff's cottages. When the hay spontaneously ignited, the plaintiff's buildings caught fire and were burned down. Sec id.
104 l'auglum, 3 Bing. at 471, 132 Eng. Rep. at 492. This direction was the first annunciation of the objective, or "reasonable man" standard in negligence actions. Sec SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 108. In the nisi p1ius report, Patteson, J.'s jury instmctions are gi\'en as follows:
You will say whether the defendant has acted as a man of ordinm·y skill and prudence would have acted, or whether through his negligence and carelessness the plaintiff's property has been consumed .... if you think that by his in· judicious want of care the injury has been occasioned, he is liable in this action. In Langridge v. Levy, 108 the defendant gun merchant sold a rifle to plaintiff's father, knowingly misrepresenting that the respected craftsman Nock had made it for the late King George IV. Subsequently, the younger Langridge used the gun, which exploded, causing him injury. An action in case was brought before Alderson, B. at the 1836 Somersetshire Summer Assizes, the declaration alleging that "the defendant was guilty of great breach of duty," violation of warranty, and knowing deceit. 109 Baron Alderson left the jury to decide on the existence, breach, and possible scienter of the warranty, but did not charge them as to the possible violation of a duty of care. 110 Consequently, the jury found a £400 general verdict for the plaintiff.
In Michaelmas Term, 1836, Levy's counsel obtained a rule nisi for arresting the judgment on the grounds that an action on the case was inappropriate where the parties lacked privity of contract, and that in any event "no duty could result out of a mere private contract, the defendant being clothed with no official or professional character out of which a known duty could arise. "111 The motion to arrest judgment was argued before the Court of Exchequer in Hilary Term, 1837. Plaintiff's counsel showed cause by contending that actions on the case were "peculiarly applicable" to circumstances where harm arose from a contractual breach upon which the injured party could not directly sue. 112 This was because even in the absence of privity between the parties, the law "imposes" a duty upon an individual furnishing "that which by his misconduct may become dangerous to another" t9 take "reasonable care" that the article not cause injury.m When a breach of this duty of reasonable care caused harm, the plaintiff could sue upon either the duty arising out of the contract, or the one imposed by law. Hence "the present case may be rested on both these grounds. "114 Discharging the rule in arrest of judgment, the Court of Exchequer held that lack of privity most assuredly prevented the plaintiff ruled that an implied duty arose from the affirmative act of falsely misrepresenting the gun's safety. By doing so, the defendant had created a dangerous situation-and thus a duty-where none had previously existed. 115 Parke, B., however, explicitly rejected the broad principle of duty suggested by plaintiff's counsel:
We are not prepared to rest the case upon one of the grounds on which the learned counsel for the plaintiff sought to support his right of action, namely, that wherever a duty is imposed on a person by contract or otherwise, and that duty is violated, any one who is injured by the violation of it may have a remedy against the wrong-doer: we think this action may be supported without laying down a principle which would lead to that indefinite extent of liability ... and we should pause before we made a precedent by our decision.116
Thus, although approving liability within the narrow context of a defendant having knowingly created a danger, the Court of Exchequer explicitly rejected any broader expansion of a general duty of care.
B. Priestley v. Fowler as a Negligence Action
The judicial decision in P1iestley is best understood within the circumstances of the emerging independent tort of negligence as a failed attempt to create a duty of care on behalf of masters towards their servants.
To begin with, the only viable claim available to Charles Priestley was a suit in negligence, whether against Fowler directly or vicariously through a fellow employee. This was because as a pauper casually injured in Peterborough, Priestley had no recourse against his presumed parish of settlement, Market Deeping. 117 At the same time, having undertaken payment of his son's medical bills "voluntarily" (meaning, without either a promise of repayment from an overseer or approval of such expenses by the medical union's Board of Governors), Brown Priestley lacked grounds for legal redress against the was to assert that the master I servant relationship was similar to one of the established pre-industrial undertakings in which duty bound the parties' actions. 120 Because Priestley was hurt while riding on a van, Serjeant Goulbourne likened his position to that of a passenger conveyed by a common carrier, a stagecoach. This assertion was alleged successfully in the declaration and at trial, but was rebuffed at oral argument by Abinger, C.B.t2t A related avenue for recovery in negligence was through a contractual relationship, and so Goulbourne put a clever spin on Abinger, C.B.'s rebuke, trying to establish a contractual connection in the master I servant relationship equivalent to that of a coach and passenger.l22 Combined, these contentions explain why Abinger, C.B. 's opinion began with a rejection of an obligation arising from both the "mere relation of master and servant" as well as from "con tract. "123 A second method of founding responsibility for negligence was to claim that a general duty of care extended from Fowler to Priestley, a notion inaugurated earlier that same year by the Court of Common Pleas in Vaughan. 124 Although no explicit proof links the two cases, a good deal of inference suggests that their convergence was hardly coincidental,125 Sitting on the Vaughan court was Park, J., who had tried 11Bfd.
119 Other reasons are set out infra note 157. 1 2° It is instructh·e that in prefacing his arguments Goulbourne stated that "there is no precedent exactly in point," while Abinger, C.B.'s opinion was absolute in insisting that "there is not precedent for the present action." Priestley v. Priestley's assize case. Recognising a member of the Bench sympathetic to extending liability, it would have been in Goulbourne's best. interests to hear the arguments presented in the case. Coupling the fact that the arguments in l'aughan were conducted only days before those of Adams in Pliestley, with the plausible Law Journal report that Goulbourne had shown cause at an earlier time than his adversary, it seems conceivable that he had taken the opportunity to observe the arguments for the rule nisi in Common Pleas. At the very least, it would not have been difficult for a well-connected Serjeant at Law to receive information about the case.l2 6 More significant are the implicit references in Pliestley to l'aughan. For example, Goulbourne's declaration that in the absence of precedent Priestley's suit "was maintainable on general principles oflaw," 1 2 7 might have been influenced by the Court of Common Pleas's upholding liability in its own case of first impression because, in Park, J. 's words, "Although the facts in this case are new in specie, they fall within a principle long established. " 128 Moreover, Abinger, C. B.'s ruling in Pliestley that the standard of any master's duty of care was purely subjective "to the best of his judgment, information, and belief, " 129 seems a direct rebuttal to the objective standard issued in l'aughan of "using such reasonable caution as a prudent man would have exercised under such circumstances. "130 Finally, three reasons may explain why no citations to Vaughan appear in Pliestley. First, although arguments in l'aughan were conducted prior to those in Priestley, the decision was not delivered until a week afterwards. Consequently, Goulbourne may have been reluctant to cite a case whose ultimate disposition was uncertain. Second, even if he knew the result, Goulbourne may not have wanted to rely on a judgment involving Park, J. before the Court of Exchequer owing to possible animosity against the assize verdict. Third, while it seems certain that in the ten months they reserved opinion in Priestley the Barons of the Exchequer became aware of Vaughan, judicial rivalry may have prevented them from acknowledging the existence of a conflicting opinion that they were powerless to overrule.
The most novel way of affLxing a duty of care on Fowler was to allege that it was implied by law even in the absence of a pre-existing relationship or of privity of contract. This theory also made its debut that same year, in Lang~idge.i3i As with Vaughan, it seems more than fortuitous that the principles presented both by Serjeant Goulbourne and by the Barons of the Exchequer in P1iestley were intertwined with those of Lang~idge. The motion arresting judgment in Lang~idge was argued before the Court of Exchequer only days prior to its parallel in Pliestley. Again, if not physically present, it was likely that Goulbourne procured intelligence regarding the case. As an advocate who would soon appear before the same court to argue a similar motion, he would have been foolish to ignore that opportunity.
Goulbourne's arguments before the Court of Exchequer confirm this hypothesis. Goulbourne argued that his client could maintain an action in either assumpsit or case because the law implied "coextensive" duties, 132 emulating the statement by plaintiffs counsel in Lang~idge that "the present case may be rested on both these grounds. "13 3 Priestley's counsel also averred that after verdict it had to be intended that Fowler had known of the van's overloading, thus creating a dangerous situation for which he was liable. 134 This was patterned after the argument in Lang~idge that the law "imposes" a duty upon an individual furnishing "that which by his misconduct may become dangerous to another" to take "reasonable care" that the article should not cause injury.I35
The Lang~idge decision was rendered in April; Pliestley necessitated an additional seven months before making its appearance. Abinger, C.B., Alderson, B., and Parke, B., each sat the bench for both cases. The Chief Baron rendered the Pliestley decision, Alderson charged the assize jury in Langridge, and Parke, B. rendered the opinion on appeal. They were certain to have discussed these cases, and in the ten month period intervening argument and decision, Parke, B. had more than ample opportunity to justify the reputation that he "exercised a potent, if not preponderant, influence" on the Excheq- 137 Parke, B.'s sway manifested itself in both Exchequer opinions. During Goulbourne's January argument in Priestley, Abinger, C.B. opined that liability existed when a master either knowingly exposed his servant to an existing risk or, in the absence of knowledge, "positively guaranteed" his safety.I 38 Parke, B.'s April Langridge decision explicitly rejected broad principles of duty, upholding recovery on the narrow ground that because the defendant had created a dangerous situation, he was duty bound not to cause the plaintiff harm. 139 In November, Abinger, C.B.'s Priestley opinion began by dismissing the assertion that Fowler's knowledge of overloading could be intended after verdict, but was silent as to whether Fowler's having commanded Priestley to ride in the van after Beeton's remonstrance implied a guarantee. 140 The absence of citations to Langridge in Priestley is not surprising. Goulbourne, as before, would not have wanted to found his arguments on an appellate decision of uncertain result, much less so an assize verdict in which Alderson, B. nonsuited the plaintiff while taking great care to avoid sanctioning the creation of a novel liability theory. Moreover, after Parke, B. had so vehemently denied plaintiff's liability theory in Langridge, the Court of Exchequer certainly would not have wanted to dignify it by reference. Therefore, as demonstrated both by the arguments presented before the Court of Exchequer as well as the grounds of its decision, Pliestley was an unsuccessful attempt to create a master I servant duty of care, and did not directly address the issue offellow servant liability.
C. The Rise of Common Employment
In Railway Co.l4! and Wigmore v. jay 1 4 2 wherein the defence of common employment was born "naked and unashamed,"l43 no reported English case addressed the doctrine.144
Hutchinson was an action brought under the Fatal Accidents Act 145 by the widow of a railway labourer killed when the carriage in which he was conveyed collided with another of the defendant's carriages.146 On a special demurrer before Pollock, C.B. and Parke, Rolfe, Alderson, and Platt, B.B., plaintiffs counsel averred that "[t]he only reported case bearing on the point" was Priestley. 147 That decision, he argued, stood for the proposition that masters were not liable to servants who could protect themselves using "common prudence and caution," but that otherwise "why should a servant be without remedy in cases where a stranger may sue?"l48 Defence counsel responded that Hutchinson's claim could not prevail in light of the Court of Exchequer's previous ruling in Priestley because, unlike a passenger, a servant "virtually undertakes all ordinary risks" incident to his service.149 Without citing any legal basis, he then asserted that "it is difficult to see why a master should be responsible for the acts of his servants inter se. WigmoTe, a bricklayer died in the collapse of scaffolding knowingly erected with an unsound ledger pole under a foreman's supervision. At the conclusion of trial before Pollock, C.B. at the Middlesex Sittings after Michaelmas Term 1849, the defendant broadly claimed without elucidating "on the authority of Priestley," that the action could not be maintained. The Chief Baron agreed, directing a verdict for the defendant because he had not personally attended the scaffolding's construction.157
Arguing for a new trial before the Court of Exchequer, Wigmore's counsel, Watson, made a clever attempt to avoid the appare1it obstruction created by Pliestley, while also making use of the recent holding in Hutchinson. Mr. Watson asserted that Priestley was inapplicable because the duty therein alleged "was similar to that of a common carrier."158 Moreover, Wigmore involved the unequal status of a bricklayer and his supervising construction foreman rather than the interaction of fellow-servants. Next, alluding to Hutchinson, counsel 15 maintained that his client's claim was also dissimilar in that it was grounded in "a duty that arises out of the contract of service" not to use faulty equipment rather than in a master's general duty.159
Unswayed by Watson's reasoning, Pollock, C.B. equated Wigmore's claim in principle with the "doctrine laid down" in P,iestley and affirmed in Hutchinson. He therefore denied the motion on the ground that the plaintiff had not proven the foreman either deficient in skill or improperly employed.1 6 0 By so holding, the Court of Exchequer limited a master's liability to his servant to instances which involved his personal, rather than vicarious actions. 161 Once again, the rationale for denying the plaintiff's claim had not been raised by defence counsel at trial or on appeal.
Eight years after Hutchinson and Wigmore were handed down by the Exchequer, the House of Lords "firmly and finally established "162 the doctrine of common employment, for both England and Scot- The majority of those who did, however, referenced the case for the general absence of a duty of care by a master towards his servant rather than for the doctrine of common employment. In so doing these judges, not surprisingly, followed Parke, B., who had sat the bench in both 1 66 Thus, Cranworth, L.C.: "The principle of the law of England I take to have been ennunciated in the case of Hutchinson .... " Bartonshi/1, 3 Macq. at 276. Parenthetically, Lord Cranworth appended the entire Farwell opinion to his judgment in McGuire, thus raising the interesting question of whether the real villain in the development of common employment was not Abinger, C.B., but rather the redoubtable Lemuel Shaw. This seems plausible because the eight year gap between Farwell and Hutchinson was sufficient for knowledge of the former to have crossed the Atlantic. Such a scenario also raises the possibility that the "influence" which is normally thought to have proceeded in only one direction during this period, from England towards America, might in fact have also went the other way. ., the plaintiff, a collier, alleged that he had been injured when descending a shaft that had been knowingly constructed in an unsafe manner by the defendant mine owners, one of whom was also the on-site manager. After Keating,]. declined to nonsuit the plaintiff, the jury returned a £150 verdict, finding that Shaw and Unwin had been personally negligent in the matter. Defendants' counsel obtained a rule to enter a nonsuit or in arrest of judgment on the ground that the declaration did not sustain a cause of action.l7 5 At oral argument before the King's Bench the following Easter Term, both parties' counsel relied upon Pliestley for the same proposition, namely that the declaration would be unsupportable if Mellors had actually known about the defect. They disagreed, however, on whether the declaration alleged Mellor's ignorance of the defect sufficiently so as to make a prima facie claim. Neither side raised the possibility of the shaft having been either built or maintained by plaintiff's fellow servants.l7 6 In discharging the rule, Crompton,]. reflected "that the rule laid down in [Ptiestley] , that a servant on entering the service of an employer takes upon himself the risks of the service, does not apply where there has been personal negligence in the master which causes the injury to the servant.'' 177 Blackburn,]. added that "[t]he ground of the decision is that there was no warranty on the part of the master that the carriage should be free from defects or that no injury should happen to his servant. "178 Accordingly, when decisions referenced precedents for the principle of common employment, as a matter of course they cited to Bar- 180 an appeal from a verdict given under Lord Campbell's Act for the death of a worker engaged in erecting a tower for the Crystal Palace. Making the rule absolute on the ground that the deceased was in common employment with the negligent actors, Baron Alderson held that "[t]he true principle is, in our opinion, to be found in" Hutchinson, namely, "that a master is not in general responsible to one servant for an injury occasioned to him by the negligence of a fellow servant whilst they are acting in one common service. "181 More ample evidence of Ptiestley's restriction as a precedent is found in contemporary treatises where the actual decision is cited for either the general proposition that no implied duty of care extended from masters to their servants, or for the specific holding that a master was not held responsible for an unknown wagon defect. 2°3 The author will delineate the larger story of how and why the doctrine of common employment gained its ascendancy in a future work. 204 Of whom the Exchequer Barons were a particularly warm audience. Lord Abinget~ who had been one of the greatest advocates ever known at the bar, had an ad,·ocate's talent, which mainly consists in the itn·ention of analogies, and there never was a more perfect master of that art than Lord Abit1ger, and he took it v.oith him to the bench; and I think it may be suggested that the law as to the non-liability of masters with regard to fellow sef\'ants arose principally from the ingenuity of Lord Abit1ger it1 suggestit1g analogies it1 the case of Pticstlcy v. Fowlct: he rule has been settled by a series of cases, beginning with" P1iestley "that a servant undertakes all ordinary risks of employment, including those arising from fellow servants.211 On occasion, two judges gave different views of Pliestley within the same opinion.212 Thus, the ruling's significance was recast and expanded so as to originate the doctrine of common employment.
The same phenomenon was paralleled in treatises. As a group, legal commentators moved from narrowly utilising Priestley to illustrate masters' general nonliability to their servants, to vacillating on the decision's significance,21 3 to eventually stating the now-received wisdom that Pliestley originated the doctrine of common employment. 214 A good illustration of the evolution of this revisionist view can be seen by comparing the three editions of Spike's treatises on master/servant law. The first edition, published in 1839, reports Priestley as going to the lack of duty of masters towards their servants, adding almost as an afterthought, that it may also apply to "other servants. (stat- ing that the doctrine of common employment was initially applied in Priestley, but "first definitely formulated" in Hutchinson). 214 See, e.g.,J. By the relation of master and servant, no contract is implied, and therefore no duty created, on the part of the master, to make good to the servant any damage arising to him from any vice or imperfection (unknown to the master) existing in the article or thing used in his service, or from the mode of using the same; nor for the negligence of his other servants.
Guardian approval prior to ministering casual accident victims. 226 Although two of Simpson's interpretations of the related case law are suspect,22 7 his insightful reasoning that changes in the Poor Law stimulated Priestley's lawsuit is convincing.
Nonetheless, the dearth of pre-Priestley precedent evidences to Richard Epstein "an ironclad rule of breathtaking simplicity: no employee could ever recover from any employer for any workplace accident-period. "228 This "ironclad rule" reflected a communal understanding that an employee should be grateful for the opportunity of gainful employment. ... In a society in which disease and injury were rampant, and life itself fragile and short .... Why should the legal system intervene on behalf of those fortunate enough to gain employment when there were countless others, far worse off, who would gladly trade places with them? 229 However appealing (and paradoxical that the politically libertarian) Epstein's melodramatic explanation may be to those inclined towards the Marxist school of historical inquiry, 230 it nonetheless begs the question of why industrial accidents were unique among the panoply of work-related grievances. Had servants been that intimidated and repressed, they would never have taken any action against their masters. Yet, servants frequently sued for wages,2 31 hauled their masters before magistrates to complain of ill treatment and to compel contractual adherence, 232 and even brought actions for libel when references endangered their future employment,233 It should also be noted that rioting and striking were not unknown occurrences among disaffected workers. Nevertheless, Epstein's explanation might well be an accurate depiction of judicial attitudes and class perspective during the nineteenth century. 234 The frequency with which servants pursued judicial action against their masters outside the context of work-related injuries also diminishes the otherwise persuasive argument that posits prohibitive litigation costs as the reason workers did not seek legal redress for their harms. The most compelling support for this assertion is put forth by Bartrip and Burman who explain that because the older local courts-such as the Liverpool Court of Passage-often had jurisdictional limitations below £5, workmen were forced to seek redress in one of the central courts where costs, fees, and legal expenses made litigation unlikely. Legal aid was also a remote option because impecunious plaintiffs still had to obtain a lawyer's certificate affirming their claims as viable. As a result of this requirement "a vicious circle was created whereby an applicant came to court for gratuitous legal services because he could not beg for a lawyer's services," only to fmd "that he must beg or pay for a lawyer's certificate before the court would hear him. " 235 Still, in spite of these difficulties in bringing suit, Bartrip and Burman suggest that the "unsensational reporting" of Ptiestley "indicate[s] that such cases had come to court before, at the Assize level. " 236 While this last hypothesis has not been substantiated, it goes hand-in-hand with Terrance Ingman's assertion that Priestley countered an already established employers' liability. 237 Specifically, he contends that cases of "ill-treatment of apprentices, the health and welfare of servants, and the working conditions of seamen," were "consistent with an employer's duty of care prior to 1837." 238 Although this assertion is given more case law support in his unpublished doctoral thesis 239 (which is cited with approbation by Bartrip and Burman) ,240 it is nonetheless incorrect.
To begin with, the legal status of menial servants, apprentices, and seamen were significantly different. Next, the apprentice cases are irrelevant as they involve harm that was caused intentionally, not through inadvertence.2 4 1 The seamen and apprentice cases are likewise extraneous as their working conditions were governed by custom which varied from that which regulated servants. 24 2 In addition, the cases Ingman cited in proof of the contention that employers were bound to care for their workers are unsupportive of that proposition.243 Lamb v. Buna? 44 held that medical care for casual paupers is cided the case upon the "individualistic notions of fault and responsibility" between employers and employees rather than on a type of "contractual theory" implicit in volenti. 252 Both are correct, as their explanations are not exclusive. While Simpson's assertion accurately describes the actual ratio of Pliestley, Ingman's interpretation delineates some future ramifications of the decision.
Convinced that Pliestley was both analytically and technically poor, R.W. Kostal is sceptical regarding the case's importance, instead believing it to be the "unreliable precedent of an unreliable judge. "253 In support of his contention, Kostal cites the little known case of AnnswoTth v. South Eastern Railway,254 brought under the Fatal Accidents Act2 55 following a railway worker's death through the negligence of his fellow employees. The action was tried at the Surrey Summer Assizes before Parke, B. who instructed the jury that it could find the defendant company vicariously liable if its servants were at fault. A verdict was returned for the widow Armsworth.2 56 Because neither Parke, B. nor either side's counsel cited Pliestley or "any other case indicating that Tespondeat supe~ioT did not apply in circumstances where one of an employer's servants inadvertently caused injury to another," Kostal concluded that Pliestley's decision was "unreliable. " 257 Several flaws undermine Kostal's reasoning. First, at the time of trial, Priestley was the only recorded decision of an employee suing his employer for accidental injury.2 58 Thus, beyond Pliestley, no precedent existed for either counsel to cite. 259 Next, and of more consequence, is Kostal's interpreting the ruling in Priestley as one going to vicarious liability when the actual basis of the decision went only to a master's direct negligence towards his servant. It was because of this limitation that Priestley was irrelevant to the litigants as a precedent. Third, Parke, B.'s jury instructions indicate that he may have believed the Fatal Accidents Act, with which he was not familiar, further sanctioned liability in these circumstances.2 60 This confusion, perhaps surprising in a jurist as esteemed as Parke, B., was noted at the time by at least one treatise writer. 261 From those same instructions it may also be inferred that, in the dozen years since Pdestley, Parke, B. may have been sufficiently influenced by successful railway passenger litigation to believe that contrary to Abinger, C.B.'s fiery dictum, "the mere relation of master and servant" could indeed imply a common-law duty "on the part of the master, to cause the servant to be safely and securely carried" when conveyed on his master's railway.262 Lastly, contrary to having been "unreliable," Abinger, C.B.'s dictum was very cleverly worded, providing fodder for successive judges to expand the doctrine of common employment. 263 Regardless of which explanation is correct, Parke, B.'s jury instructions clearly indicate that as late as comment from lose: "All I can say is, that there is no trace of it in the law books at any earlier date than this, and no reference appears to ha,·e been made to it by the counsel" for Fowler, "[y] et it is hardly possible that he should not have referred to such a rule if it existed." SPENs & YoUNGER, supra note 182, at 66. 260 "I am called on for the first time, to assist in the trial of a case arising under a statue passed last yeat·, which has made a great change in the law of England." Annsworth, 11 Jur. at 760. 1848 a jurist who carried great influence in delineating the boundaries of employers' vicarious liability harboured no doubt as to the viability of a worker recovering at common law against his master for injuries received from a fellow servant.
Finally, Kostal's analysis implicitly raises the traditionally held interpretation of Priestley as establishing the doctrine of common employment.264 The basis of this widely held wisdom lies in the plethora of examples employed by Lord Abinger in delineating the "absurdity" of allowing recovery.2 6 5 Abinger, C.B. 's hypotheticals certainly contemplated suits by servants against their masters for the negligence of tlu~ir fellow employees based on a theory of vicarious liability, and thus inspired later appellate judges in creating the common-law defences of common employment and volenti. Yet, no matter what liability nightmare had haunted the Chief Baron, the actual ruling of the case went only to a master's direct liability to his servant for his own negligence. In addition, the plaintiff never once asserted that anyone other than Fowler caused his injuries. In point of fact, the identity (or even existence, for it is possible that Charles Priestley did so himself) of the individuals who loaded the wagon was never presented in evidence.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated how Priestley v. Fowler is best understood within the framework of the emerging independent tort of negligence as a failed effort to extend master/servant liability, rather than as establishing the doctrine of common employment. In so doing, it illustrated that Hutchinson v. York was the true source of the defence, and that this was the standard contemporary estimation. The Article also described how, incrementally, Priestley came to be incor- 264 Because Priestley can only be unreliable in failing to preclude vicarious liability in An11swort!t if it created the defence of common employment. Sec l'l'hCHAEL LoBBAN, THE CoMMON LAW AND ENGLISH jURISPRUDENCE 1760-1850, at 285-86 (1991) . 265 Warning that in the future masters would be liable to the servant, for the negligence of the chambermaid, in putting him into a damp bed, for that of the upholsterer for sending in a crazy bedstead, whereby the servant was made to fall down, while asleep, and injure himself for the negligence of the cook in not properly cleansing the copper vessels used in the kitchen; of the butcher in supplying the family with meat of a quality injurious to health; of the builder for a defect in the foundation of the house, whereby it fell and injured both the master and servant in ruins.
rectly understood as originating common employment. Lastly, the general inaccuracy of other interpretations was demonstrated. Accordingly, if P1iestley was "the notorious father of an infamous line of precedents, " 266 the progeny were illegitimate.
